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When Advisors’ True Intentions
Are in Question. How Do Bank
Customers Cope with Uncertainty
in Financial Consultancies?
Barbara Mackinger*, Eva Jonas and Christina Mühlberger
Department of Psychology, Social Psychology, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
When making financial decisions bank customers are confronted with two types of
uncertainty: first, return on investments is uncertain and there is a risk of losing money.
Second, customers cannot be certain about their financial advisor’s true intentions.
This might decrease customers’ willingness to cooperate with advisors. However, the
uncertainty management model and fairness heuristic theory predict that in uncertain
situations customers are willing to cooperate with financial advisors when they perceive
fairness. In the current study, we investigated how perceived fairness in the twofold
uncertain situations increased people’s intended future cooperation with an advisor.
We asked customers of financial consultancies about their experienced uncertainty
regarding both the investment decision and the advisor’s intentions. Moreover, we
asked them about their perceived fairness, as well as their intention to cooperate with
the advisor in the future. A three-way moderation analysis showed that customers
who faced high uncertainty regarding the investment decision and high uncertainty
regarding the advisor’s true intentions indicated the lowest intended cooperation with
the advisor but high fairness increased their cooperation. Interestingly, when people
were only uncertain about the advisor’s intentions (but certain about the decision) they
indicated less cooperation than when they were only uncertain about the decision (but
certain about the advisor’s intentions). A mediated moderation analysis revealed that this
relationship was explained by customers’ lower trust in their advisors.
Keywords: uncertainty, self-interest, fairness, trust, advice taking
INTRODUCTION
Ninety-four-year-old Mrs X, whose cognitive and physical abilities are impaired by old age,
received a sizeable amount of money from her disbursed life insurance. To reduce her uncertainty
on how to reinvest the money, she consulted a financial advisor. The advisor recommended that
the “optimal” solution was to put her money in a long-term investment—obviously not considering
Mrs X’s age (WirtschaftsWoche, 2009). Thus, one may doubt the advisor’s trustworthiness. What
was the advisor’s motive and has s/he acted in the client’s best interest or rather in her/his own
interest? In 2008 the global financial crisis had swamped the Eurozone. During this time the crisis
dramatically expanded in the European public sphere. It was not only centered in the attention
of political leaders, public opinion, and media. Also private persons like Mrs X were involved
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and harmed. Especially, those who had been working with a
financial advisor were now facing a dilemma: on the one hand
they wanted and needed advice, but on the other hand they were
not sure if they could rely on their financial advisor. In recent
years the media has reported many incidents where experts did
not have the knowledge about the optimal investment or at any
rate did not use their knowledge to best help their customers.
As a result, the questions remain—how can customers regain
confidence and how can banks and financial consultants win back
their customers’ trust in uncertain situations?
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is experienced when people feel unable to predict
future events or when they feel inconsistencies between
important cognitions, experiences, or behaviors (Van den Bos
and Lind, 2002). Uncertainty can be provoked by various
situations. For example, thinking about insecure aspects of
one’s self or one’s relationships to others, or losing control
over one’s own life can lead to aversive and threatening
feelings (Van den Bos and Miedema, 2000; Van den Bos,
2001) which people strive to reduce (Van den Bos and
Lind, 2002; Heine et al., 2006; Hogg, 2007). Such uncertainty
is also relevant in investment decisions where people are
dependent on the financial market. Even if they choose a
low risk product such as a long-term fixed capital saving,
they face the risk of a decreased interest rate. Therefore,
investing money is a risky decision which entails uncontrollable
consequences, making one’s future unpredictable and thus,
uncertain.
Uncertainty about the Investment
Decision
One way to cope with uncertainty about one’s decisions is to
look for advice (for overview see Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006).
Advice helps people to optimize their choice and gain confidence
in their decisions (Heath and Gonzalez, 1995; Budescu et al.,
2003). This is especially true for financial investment decisions,
which contain high risks, in particular the risk of losing money.
However, an advisor’s knowledge reduces such uncertainty and
improves accuracy only if people can trust the advice they receive
(Sniezek et al., 2004; Yaniv, 2004). This means that even if people
decide to receive advice, they cannot be sure if the advice is of
high quality.
To estimate the quality of the advice, customers use cues.
One such cue is an advisor’s expertise. Harvey and Fischer
(1997) showed that people are twice as likely to accept advice
from experts as to accept advice from novices. In particular
they found that perceived expertise predicts subsequent advice
utilization, suggesting that a person’s impression of whether
or not an advisor is an expert is very important to clients
(de Vries and Wilke, 1995; Harvey and Fischer, 1997; Sniezek
and Van Swol, 2001; Jungermann and Fischer, 2005). Thus, the
perceived expertise of the advisor is a cue, which can reduce
people’s uncertainty regarding their decisions. With regard to
high-risk decisions, also a second cue is important – the advisor’s
expressed confidence (for an overview, see Bonaccio and Dalal,
2006). If an advisor is perceived as highly confident, customers
gain confidence themselves (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Sniezek
and Van Swol, 2001; Price and Stone, 2004). As a consequence,
recommendations of highly confident advisors are followed more
often than those of less confident peers (Sniezek and Buckley,
1995; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001). However, advisors often
overestimate their confidence (Price and Stone, 2004; McKenzie
et al., 2008) and use this overconfidence as a strategy to persuade
customers (Van Swol, 2009). This phenomenon is also present
in the context of financial consulting: participants confronted
with a fictitious financial advisor preferred an overconfident
advisor over a moderately confident advisor and even assumed
the overconfident advisor to be more knowledgeable (Price and
Stone, 2004). Thus, the expressed confidence of the advisor is
another cue, which can reduce people’s uncertainty regarding
their decisions.
Accordingly, in situations where people are uncertain
regarding their decisions, customers focus on cues allowing them
to gain the needed confidence for their decisions. However,
in financial consultancies, people do not only have to cope
with uncertainty regarding the decision but also regarding the
advisor’s true intentions either to support the client or to pursue
self-interest. Therefore, in addition to having to cope with
uncertainty about their investment decision (UnD), clients also
have to cope with uncertainty regarding the advisor (UnA).
Uncertainty about the Advisor’s Intention
Uncertainty regarding the advisor refers to the difficulty to
identify his/her true intentions. Usually, the financial advisor
possesses information and knowledge that the client lacks. The
lack of knowledge makes it difficult for the client to assess whether
the advisor is acting in the best interest of the client. According
to Principal–Agent Theory (Ross, 1973; for an overview, see
Eisenhardt, 1989), agents (advisors) who pursue their own goals
instead of acting in the principal’s (client’s) best interest use their
scope of action to behave in a strategic way (conflicting goals).
In financial consulting, the advisor might neglect to carry out
all necessary actions (“hidden action”) such as searching for less
risky investments, might withhold information about potential
risks from the client (“hidden information”), or might hide
their true intentions (“hidden intentions”) and thus, unbalanced
relationships follow. The client is dependent on the advisor and
thus, susceptible to deception. The less the client knows about
the advisor’s actions, information, and intentions, the more the
client’s uncertainty increases.
Knowing the advisor’s intentions is crucial to the client’s
continued reliance on the advisor (Bonaccio and Dalal, 2009).
A study by Jodlbauer and Jonas (2011) showed that customers
who did not know their advisor’s true intentions but assumed
their advisor to pursue self-interested intentions evaluated
him/her less trustworthy. As a consequence, people were less
likely to utilize the advisor’s recommendations. So how can
people cope with such uncertainty?
To find answers to this question, we build on two theoretical
models from justice research – the Uncertainty Management
Model (UMM) and the Fairness Heuristic Theory (FHT, Van den
Bos et al., 1998; Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, 2001) which might
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help to reduce uncertainty regarding the investment decision and
uncertainty regarding the advisor.
The Uncertainty Management Model
The Uncertainty Management Model (Van den Bos and Lind,
2002; see also Lind and Van den Bos, 2002) describes how
people cope with general uncertainty. According to the UMM,
uncertainty is a general and abstract concept that can also be
induced in an abstract way (e.g., by thinking about uncertainty
in terms of emotions or losing control or thinking about insecure
aspects of one’s own life; Van den Bos and Miedema, 2000; Van
den Bos, 2001). Such general uncertainty, which makes people’s
future unpredictable increases people’s sensitivity to fairness cues,
e.g., whether one has voice in a given situation (procedural
fairness; Van den Bos and Miedema, 2000; Van den Bos, 2001).
People also react with more positive affect toward fair and more
negative affect toward unfair treatment (Van den Bos, 2001).
Thus, applied to investment decisions, fairness may be a valuable
cue when people experience general uncertainty about their
decisions.
The Fairness Heuristic Theory
The Fairness Heuristic Theory (Van den Bos et al., 1998;
Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, 2001) explains how people cope
with uncertainty regarding a person’s trustworthiness in an
interdependent relationship, i.e., a relationship in which one is
dependent on another person (e.g., employee and authority).
Uncertainty regarding trustworthiness means that one does not
know whether the other person will keep one’s best interests in
mind (Barber, 1983). Thus, fear of exploitation and exclusion is
present (Van den Bos et al., 1998; Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, 2001).
In such situations, people use fairness cues to decide whether to
cooperate with the other person. For example, when participants
were uncertain about the trustworthiness of an authority, they
showed higher commitment to a decision when they were given
voice (procedural fairness) compared to no voice (Van den
Bos et al., 1998). This means that fairness can compensate for
people’s uncertainty and the resulting unwillingness to cooperate
because of the interaction partner’s trustworthiness. However, the
authors also emphasize that fairness is not the same as trust.
While fairness is an evaluation whether a person acts or decides
morally correct, trust is a person’s willingness to be vulnerable
to the actions of another party. Therefore, trust always involves
uncertainty regarding the risk of being exploited (Coleman,
1990; Moorman et al., 1992; Mayer et al., 1995). Based on this
definition trust is something highly fragile (Mayer et al., 1995).
The perception of trust in interdependent relationships is highly
relevant when people decide whether to cooperate with a person
or not (Van den Bos et al., 1998; Lind, 2001; Van den Bos, 2001).
Research showed that clients who perceived self-interest on behalf
of their advisors, mistrusted their advisors and were consequently
less likely to accept advice (Jodlbauer and Jonas, 2011) and even
showed aggressive intentions and negative attitudes toward the
interaction partner (Steindl and Jonas, 2015).
Bank customers are in uncertain situations and do not know
if they can trust their advisor. To investigate how people cope
with such uncertainty we tested – based on the UMM and FHT –
whether uncertainty increases people’s sensitivity to fairness cues
and increase their willingness to cooperate with financial advisors
regarding their investment decisions.
Dimensions of Fairness
When deciding whether or not a situation is fair people seem
to distinguish between different aspects of fairness (or justice1):
the distribution of resources (distributive fairness; Adams, 1965),
the provision and transparency of information (informational
fairness; Bies and Moag, 1986), the procedures on which the
decision is based (Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Leventhal, 1976,
1980), and whether they have been treated with respect and
dignity (interpersonal fairness; Bies and Moag, 1986; for an
overview, see Colquitt, 2001). These four aspects of fairness
perceptions are used as cues to guide evaluation in uncertain
situations (e.g., Van den Bos and Miedema, 2000; Lind, 2001; Van
den Bos, 2001). Thus, the advisor’s expressed fairness may also
play an important role in financial consultancies characterized by
high uncertainty. Here, fairness may compensate for uncertainty.
The Current Research
In financial consultancies people are facing those two kinds
of uncertainty—uncertainty regarding the financial investment
decision in general and uncertainty regarding the advisor’s true
intentions. In particular in the course of the financial crisis
starting in 2008, people were confronted with both uncertainties.
Thus, we assume that they were facing general uncertainty
about their financial decisions and were especially vigilant to
financial advisors who acted in self-interested manners which
increased their uncertainty about the advisors’ trustworthiness.
To investigate how both uncertainties worked together during
the financial crisis, we integrated the UMM and the FHT. Both
theories state that people need fairness cues to regain certainty.
Therefore we predicted that perceived fairness is important when
any uncertainty is high and especially important when both
uncertainties are high. In the current study, we investigated
how the two types of uncertainty influenced people’s intended
future cooperation with an advisor and whether fairness cues can
promote trust and thus help to increase cooperation.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Procedure
Participants were invited to take part in a survey on financial
consulting2 and asked if they had contact with a financial advisor
in the last year. The data were collected in November 2009,
shortly after the beginning of the financial crisis in Europe. In
a questionnaire participants were asked to think about their
experiences with “saving and investing money” over the last year.
To answer the questions they were instructed to think about their
financial service provider. If they were customers of different
1In the literature, primarily known as distributive, informational, interpersonal,
and procedural justice (e.g., Colquitt, 2001).
2Our survey took place in November 2009; therefore uncertainty regarding
investment should have been especially salient to participants.
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service providers, they were instructed to concentrate on the
provider with whom they had spent the most time in the last year
and they were also asked how many consultancy meetings they
had.
Participants and Procedure
Two-hundred and forty-two participants answered our
questionnaire. Due to missing data on the scales cooperation
intention, UnA, and trust, we had to exclude nine participants,
leaving us with a final sample of 233 (16–813 years old;
Mage = 36.86, SD = 15.84; 138 women and 95 men). Our
participants were either approached in a shopping mall when
the University of Salzburg was having a public event there or via
the experimenter’s social networks. All participants were asked
to fill out a questionnaire in which they had to think about their
financial service providers and indicated their agreement to
several items on a scale from 1 (= not at all) to 6 (= completely).
Measures
Uncertainty
We assessed two aspects of customers’ uncertainty about their
financial service providers: uncertainty about their investment
decisions and uncertainty about their advisor (the advisor’s
strategic behavior)4.
Uncertainty about Investment Decisions (UnD)
This measure focused on the uncertainty about investment
decisions (whether they had made the right decision, e.g.,
regarding the choice of service provider or product). Five items
asked about the success of the participants’ investment (e.g.,
“Thinking about my investment in the last year raises the feeling
that I reached the “right” decision regarding my financial service
provider” inverted; α = 0.81, see complete questionnaire in the
appendix).
Uncertainty about the Advisor (UnA)
Participants were asked to think about the behavior of their
financial advisor and describe his/her behavior with the help of
the following items: the strategic behavior scale covered the three
agency problems described above [hidden intention: e.g., “In
situations where our interests were in conflict the advisor focused
on his/her interests,” seven items; hidden information: e.g., “I got
3Because of the financial practices in Austria, we also included 16- and 17-year
old participants in the analyses. In Austria it is absolutely common for kids to
have their own saving account (typically at the same financial institution as their
parents) and when they turn to become teenagers, for example at the age of 16,
they get a phone call once a year where they get invited to a financial consultancy.
Teenagers under 18 years are already an important group of customers and get
in contact with financial institutes regularly (in legal terms teenagers aged 14
and older become already contractually capable to the maximum content of their
income). Additionally one of the most popular forms of saving is a so called
“Bausparer” which is a long-term saving (6 years) where the government also pays
a bonus. A lot of young people use this to afford, e.g., a driver’s license, motorbike
or car.
4In a confirmatory factor analysis including the two aspects of uncertainty (UnD:
5 items; UnA: 19 items), we compared a one-factor to a two-factor model. This
analysis yielded a significant difference [one-factor: χ2(252) = 723.78, two-factor
model:χ2(251) = 620.71), p< 0.001], indicating that the two-factor model is more
tenable than the one-factor model.
the impression that my advisor did not communicate essential
information about the protection of the money (e.g., a capital-
back guarantee),” five items; hidden action: e.g., “My advisor
handed over written information about my investment product
after the contract conclusion (e.g., information with risk details),”
seven items]. For further analyses we combined the subscales to
produce a general uncertainty scale about the advisor (α = 0.93;
see complete questionnaire in the appendix).
Fairness
Participants evaluated their advisor’s fairness behavior with
items from the German version (Maier et al., 2007) of the
Organizational Fairness Scale (Colquitt, 2001). The items were
adapted to the financial advisor situation. Two items were
additionally developed and one original item5 was excluded.
Procedural fairness was assessed with eight items (e.g., “Have you
been able to express your views and feelings during consultations
with your advisor?”). Distributive fairness was represented with
three items (e.g., “How appropriate are your returns considering
the amount of money you invested?”). Informational fairness was
measured with seven items (e.g., “Has your advisor explained
the procedures thoroughly?”) and interpersonal fairness with
four items (e.g., “Have you been treated with dignity by your
advisor?”). In the following calculations we combined these
subscales to a general fairness scale (α = 0.94; see complete
questionnaire in the appendix).
Trust
Trust in the financial advisor was measured with items from
a questionnaire designed by Schoorman and Ballinger (2006)
with the main focus on the willingness to yield control to the
advisor and the customers’ accepted vulnerability. Five items
were translated and adapted to the financial service sector (e.g.,
“I would be willing to let my advisor have complete control
over my future investment decisions”; α = 0.566; see complete
questionnaire in the appendix).
Dependent Variable—Cooperation Intention
This scale measured the intention of the participants to further
use the consulting services of the current financial advisor (e.g.,
“I will still use the services of my financial advisor in the future”;
five items, α= 0.82; see complete questionnaire in the appendix).
For the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of all
measured variables, see Table 1.7
5“To what extent does this result reflect the effort you carried out for the
company?” This original item was excluded because the transfer in the consultancy
context did not work. We added two items extending the subscale informational
justice. They are marked in the questionnaire in the appendix as IFG2a and IFG3a.
6We used the trust scale introduced by Schoorman and Ballinger (2006). As two
items from the original questionnaire could not be adapted to the context of
the financial consultancy (“I feel comfortable being creative because my advisor
understands that sometimes creative solutions do not work”; “Increasing my
vulnerability to criticism by my supervisor would be a mistake”), we deleted those
two items. Unfortunately, Cronbach’s alpha turned out to be very low (α = 0.55).
However, this is according to some authors (e.g., Peterson, 1994) still in the
acceptable range.
7We also measured their emotions with the help of the PANAS (Watson and Clark,
1988) to which we added some additional items (e.g., uncertain, skeptical etc.)
and individual differences in emotional uncertainty with the Uncertainty Response
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TABLE 1 | Intercorrelations between all measured variables.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5
(1) Uncertainty about the Decision (UnD) 2.80 1.08 1
(2) Uncertainty about the Advisor (UnA) 2.51 0.94 0.573∗∗ 1
(3) Fairness 4.46 0.84 −0.640∗∗ −0.771∗∗ 1
(4) Trust 3.79 0.91 −0.449∗∗ −0.680∗∗ 0.620∗∗ 1
(5) Cooperation Intention 4.61 1.10 −0.565∗∗ −0.769∗∗ 0.718∗∗ 0.646∗∗ 1
Ratings were made on a six-point scale. ∗∗p < 0.01, two-tailed.
RESULTS
According to the two theoretical models dealing with
uncertainty—UMM (Lind and Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos
and Lind, 2002) and FHT (Van den Bos et al., 1998; Lind, 2001;
Van den Bos, 2001)—fairness plays a particularly important role
when uncertainty is high. Therefore, we tested how the different
types of uncertainty in combination with fairness influenced
people’s decision regarding future cooperation with the advisor.
Multiple Regression Analysis
We conducted a multiple regression including three continuous
predictors (UnA, UnD, and fairness as moderator; all
standardized), and all of their interactions regarding the
dependent variable intention to cooperate (Hayes, 2013; Model
3). We used a 95% bias corrected bootstrap confidence interval
(95% BCCI) and 5,000 bootstrap samples. High values refer to
one standard deviation above and low values to one standard
deviation below the standardized values for the respective
variable.
The analysis revealed significant main effects of UnD
(β = −0.17, SE = 0.06, t(225) = −2.65, p = 0.009, [95% CI:
−0.29 to −0.04]), UnA (β = −0.58, SE = 0.07, t(225) = −8.37,
p < 0.001, [95% CI: −0.72 to −0.45]), and perceived fairness
(β = 0.25, SE = 0.08, t(225) = 3.36, p = 0.001, [95% CI: 0.11
to 0.40]) indicating that all three variables (high UnD, high UnA,
and low fairness) decreased people’s cooperation intentions.
In addition and most importantly, the three-way interaction
between UnA, UnD, and fairness was significant, β = −0.06,
SE = 0.03, t(225) = −2.19, p = 0.030, [95% CI: −0.11 to −0.01].
Simple slopes indicated that when UnA and UnD were low, high
and low fairness did not make a difference regarding people’s
intentions to cooperate (p = 0.773). However, when any kind
of uncertainty was involved (high UnA or/and high UnD), high
fairness led to more cooperation intentions than low fairness (all
ps ≤ 0.041). Furthermore, when both uncertainties were high,
people had the lowest intentions to cooperate in both the low and
high fairness conditions (see Figure 1).
Moreover, the regression weights show that the weight for
UnA was higher than for UnD. This suggests that UnA had a
larger impact on client’s cooperation intentions than UnD. In all
conditions, whether fairness and/or UnD were high or low, high
UnA always led to lower cooperation intentions than low UnA
Scale (Greco and Roger, 2001). Individual emotional uncertainty did not relate
significantly to the intention to cooperate, r(234)=−0.020; p= 0.761.
(all ps < 0.001). In contrast, high UnD (compared to low UnD)
led to lower cooperation when UnA was high and fairness low
(p= 0.023). See Table 2 for a summary.
Additionally, we performed separate moderation analyses
for the four fairness dimensions and found significant three-
way interactions for the procedural fairness dimension, and
marginal significant three-way interactions for the distributive
and interpersonal fairness dimensions, all pointing into
the same direction (procedural fairness × UnA × UnD,
β = −0.06, SE = 0.03, t(225) = −2.19, p = 0.030; distributive
fairness × UnA × UnD, β = −0.05, SE = 0.03, t(225) = −1.78,
p = 0.076; interpersonal fairness × UnA × UnD, β = −0.06,
SE = 0.03, t(225) = −1.67, p = 0.096; see Tables 3–6). This
suggests that especially procedural fairness is important to
compensate for the uncertainties.
To test whether a loss of trust in the advisor was responsible for
the stronger influence of UnA compared to UnD on cooperation
intentions we explored the role of trust as a mediating variable
between the two types of uncertainty and cooperation intentions.
Multiple Regression Analysis
We conducted a mediated moderation analysis using
PROCESS SPSS macro (Hayes, 2013; Model 11) with the
three standardized predictors UnA (as independent variable),
UnD, and fairness (as moderator), trust (as mediator), and
the dependent variable intention to cooperate. We used a
95% bias corrected bootstrap confidence interval (95% BCCI)
and 5,000 bootstrap samples. The three-way interaction
between UnA, UnD, and fairness on trust was marginally
significant, β = 0.06, SE = 0.03, t(225) = 1.97, p = 0.050,
[95% CI: 0.00 to 0.12]. Trust had a significant effect on
cooperation intentions, β = 0.25, SE = 0.06, t(230) = 4.12,
p < 0.001, [95% CI: 0.13 to 0.37]. The direct effect of UnA
on cooperation intentions was significant as well, β = −0.67,
SE = 0.06, t(225) = −11.09, p < 0.001, [95% CI: −0.79 to
−0.55].
For the slopes, we found that trust mediated the conditional
indirect effect of UnA on cooperation when UnD was high
and fairness was low, β = −0.13, SE = 0.05, [95% CI: −0.25
to −0.06], as well when UnD was high and fairness was high,
β = −0.16, SE = 0.06, [95% CI: −0.30 to −0.07], and when
UnD was low and fairness was high β = −0.13, SE = 0.04,
[95% CI: −0.23 to −0.07]. Thus, the analyses revealed a negative
association with the customers’ intention to cooperate in future
in three conditions. However we did not observe that trust
mediated the indirect effect of UnA on cooperation when UnD
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FIGURE 1 | The effects of uncertainty about the advisor (UnA), uncertainty regarding the investment decision (UnD), and fairness on people’s intention to cooperate
with the advisor. Plotted values reflect intention to cooperate at one standard deviation below and above the standardized values for fairness. Significant slopes are
marked with asterisks. Higher values reflect higher intention to cooperate.
TABLE 2 | Effects of the moderated regression analysis (Hayes, 2013, Model 3).
Coefficient β SE t p LLCI ULCI
UnD −0.17 0.06 −2.65 0.009 −0.29 −0.04
UnA −0.58 0.07 −8.37 <0.001 −0.72 −0.45
Fairness 0.25 0.08 3.36 0.001 0.11 0.40
UnD × Fairness 0.06 0.07 0.91 0.364 −0.07 0.19
UnA × Fairness 0.10 0.06 1.64 0.102 −0.02 0.21
UnD × UnA −0.02 0.07 −0.24 0.812 −0.15 0.12
UnD × UnA × Fairness −0.06 0.03 −2.19 0.030 −0.11 −0.01
TABLE 3 | Effects of the moderated regression analysis including procedural fairness (Hayes, 2013, Model 3).
Coefficient β SE t p LLCI ULCI
UnD −0.20 0.06 −3.25 0.001 −0.32 −0.08
UnA −0.67 0.06 −10.61 <0.001 −0.79 −0.55
Procedural Fairness 0.15 0.06 2.30 0.021 0.02 0.27
UnD × procedural Fairness 0.08 0.07 1.28 0.201 −0.05 0.21
UnA × procedural Fairness 0.08 0.06 1.34 0.183 −0.04 0.20
UnD × UnA −0.02 0.06 −0.32 0.754 −0.15 0.11
UnD × UnA × procedural Fairness −0.06 0.03 −2.19 0.030 −0.12 −0.01
and fairness were both low, β = −0.05, SE = 0.04, [95%
CI: −0.15 to 0.03]. Please see Table 7 for all slopes. This
moderated mediation analysis shows that the negative relation
between UnA and intention to cooperate can be explained via
the mediator trust, which means that UnA leads to loss of trust
which can better explain the reduced cooperation intention. Only
when customers are confident in their decision (low UnD) and
perceive low fairness, trust in the advisor does no longer seem
to be involved in the process between UnA and intention to
cooperate.
DISCUSSION
We opened this paper by referring to the dilemma faced by
financial consulting customers. On the one hand, customers
want and need advice to reduce uncertainty regarding their risky
decisions. On the other hand, they have to deal with uncertainty
regarding the advisor’s true intentions, i.e., whether they
pursue their own interests instead of the clients’ best interests.
This dilemma describes two different forms of uncertainty:
uncertainty regarding investment decisions and uncertainty
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 June 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1112
fpsyg-08-01112 June 30, 2017 Time: 8:9 # 7
Mackinger et al. Uncertainty in Financial Consulting
TABLE 4 | Effects of the moderated regression analysis including distributive fairness (Hayes, 2013, Model 3).
Coefficient β SE t p LLCI ULCI
UnD −0.15 0.06 −2.44 0.015 −0.28 −0.03
UnA −0.69 0.06 −11.89 <0.001 −0.80 −0.58
Distributive Fairness 0.17 0.06 2.80 0.006 0.05 0.29
UnD × distributive Fairness 0.08 0.06 1.41 0.159 −0.03 0.19
UnA × distributive Fairness 0.12 0.06 2.00 0.047 0.00 0.24
UnD × UnA 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.902 −0.11 0.12
UnD × UnA × distributive Fairness −0.05 0.03 −1.78 0.076 −0.11 0.01
TABLE 5 | Effects of the moderated regression analysis including interpersonal fairness (Hayes, 2013, Model 3).
Coefficient β SE t p LLCI ULCI
UnD −0.21 0.06 −3.43 <0.001 −0.33 −0.09
UnA −0.61 0.06 −9.63 <0.001 −0.74 −0.49
Interpersonal Fairness 0.22 0.07 3.21 0.002 0.08 0.35
UnD × interpersonal Fairness 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.896 −0.13 0.15
UnA × interpersonal Fairness 0.01 0.06 0.22 0.829 −0.11 0.13
UnD × UnA −0.11 0.05 −2.16 0.032 −0.20 −0.01
UnD × UnA × interpersonal Fairness −0.06 0.03 −1.67 0.096 −0.12 0.01
TABLE 6 | Effects of the moderated regression analysis including informational fairness (Hayes, 2013, Model 3).
Coefficient β SE t p LLCI ULCI
UnD −0.15 0.06 −2.43 0.016 −0.27 −0.03
UnA −0.58 0.07 −7.94 <0.001 −0.72 −0.43
Informational Fairness 0.25 0.08 3.24 0.001 0.10 0.40
UnD × informational Fairness −0.01 0.06 −0.18 0.859 −0.14 0.11
UnA × informational Fairness 0.10 0.06 1.68 0.094 −0.02 0.22
UnD × UnA −0.05 0.07 −0.79 0.428 −0.18 0.08
UnD × UnA × informational Fairness −0.04 0.03 −1.43 0.154 −0.10 0.02
TABLE 7 | Trust mediating the conditional indirect effects of X (UnA, Fairness, UnD) on Y (Cooperation Intention) at values of the variables (Hayes, 2013, Model 11).
UnA UnD Fairness Coefficient β SE LLCI ULCI
−1 SD 1 SD −0.05 0.04 −0.15 0.03
−1 SD +1 SD −0.13 0.04 −0.23 −0.07
+1 SD −1 SD −0.13 0.05 −0.26 −0.06
+1 SD +1 SD −0.16 0.05 −0.30 −0.08
Fairness UnD UnA Coefficient β SE LLCI ULCI
−1 SD −1 SD 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.32
−1 SD +1 SD 0.08 0.06 −0.04 0.21
+1 SD −1 SD 0.06 0.07 −0.06 0.20
+1 SD +1 SD 0.03 0.04 −0.04 0.12
UnD UnA Fairness Coefficient β SE LLCI ULCI
−1 SD −1 SD 0.20 0.11 −0.02 0.42
−1 SD +1 SD −0.02 0.06 −0.14 0.09
+1 SD −1 SD 0.01 0.05 −0.08 0.11
+1 SD +1 SD −0.08 0.10 −0.24 0.15
regarding the advisor’s intentions. The current study examined
customers’ intended future cooperation with an advisor when
they were facing these two forms of uncertainty. Furthermore, as
research has shown that in uncertain situations people need cues
to regain their confidence, we introduced fairness as an important
predictor for cooperation in consultancies.
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We based our study on the UMM and the FHT predicting that
people react more strongly to fair treatment when uncertainty
salience is high. Therefore, we suggested that perceived fairness is
important when any uncertainty is high and especially important
when both uncertainties are high. In the present study we
asked participants to think about their experiences with “saving
and investing money,” assessed their uncertainty regarding
the decision and regarding the advisor’s intention, and their
perception of fairness in the consultancy. Our findings indicated
that whenever people were uncertain in a consultancy, whether
uncertain about the decision or/and advisor, their intentions to
cooperate with the advisor increased with perceived fairness.
Moreover, both uncertainties together led to the lowest intentions
to cooperate.
Interestingly, a higher regression weight for UnA than for
UnD indicated that in our study, UnA had a larger impact on
client’s cooperation intentions than UnD. Thus, high UnA seems
to be most costly for financial advisors regarding the customers’
intention to cooperate in the future. High experienced UnA
seems to be especially detrimental for the relationship between
the financial advisor and his/her customer. What changes in the
relationship between customers and their advisors when they are
confronted with uncertainty regarding the advisor’s intention,
i.e., when people face the risk of being exploited by their advisor?
The mediation analysis suggests that trust can help to explain
this process: because clients mistrust that their advisors act in
the client’s best interest and instead pursue their own goals, they
refrain from cooperating with the advisor. However, if people
want to work together in interdependent relationships, they need
to trust each other (Van den Bos et al., 1998; Lind, 2001; Van
den Bos, 2001). If customers, like Mrs X, face the dilemma
that they need advice, but at same time are uncertain about
their advisor’s intention, they have to ask themselves if they
can trust the advisor. When people are uncertain about another
person’s trustworthiness, trusting this person makes them even
more vulnerable and thus, even more uncertain (Deutsch, 1962;
Coleman, 1990; Moorman et al., 1992; Mayer et al., 1995).
In the current article, we have introduced fairness as a crucial
cue in uncertain consultancies. Fairness is a cue displayed in
the social interaction itself and thus differs from variables such
as the advisor’s expertise or confidence which stem from the
classic Judge-Advisor Research (for overview Bonaccio and Dalal,
2006). According to the input-process-output model proposed by
Bonaccio and Dalal (2006), expertise and expressed confidence
of an advisor are both individual level inputs. Fairness is a
process variable happening in the interaction between people.
It consists of different dimensions which should be taken into
account in consultancies because customers pay attention to
more than just fair returns on the investment of their money
(distributional fairness). They also wish to be treated with
dignity and respect (interpersonal fairness), to receive sufficient
information (informational fairness), and to understand how
decisions are made (procedural fairness; for an overview, see
Colquitt, 2001). According to our results, people need fairness
cues if they perceive high uncertainty. In our study procedural
fairness seemed to be especially important. Thus, customers who
had the feeling that they could participate in the investment
decision process increased their intention to cooperate with the
advisor.
Theoretical Implications
Prior research has established FHT and UMM to explain how
persons cope with these two types of uncertainty. Studies have
supported each of these theoretical frameworks and the two
kinds of uncertainty have been investigated separately. Thus,
previous studies found fairness cues as especially helpful in
highly general uncertain situations (UMM) or authority-oriented
based situations (FHT). The current results expanded this line
of reasoning by taking into account both uncertainties together
and found that both are important in explaining cooperation
intentions but that uncertainty regarding the advisor was more
influential. However, they did not reinforce each other. This
might be different in other consultancy situations. For example
in health-related contexts – when people ask themselves what the
best decision is and whether they can trust their advisors but they
are anxiously aroused because they worry about their health –
cues that induce mistrust might lead to overreactions. A potential
mediator in this situation might be perceived loss of control. In
future research, it would be fruitful to investigate the influence
of different kinds of uncertainties and their relationship in
various advisor–client interactions and to shed light on relevant
mediators.
Practical Implications
Resulting from the economic crisis, people seem to be highly
aware of both types of uncertainty (UnA and UnD) and even
more vigilant to advisor’s trustworthiness. Therefore, since then,
bank customers may evaluate the financial consultancy through
the eyes of uncertainty. Consequently, it is important for banks
to develop strategies that help their customers overcome this
uncertainty. Our findings suggest that fair treatment might
be such a strategy. Fairness increased people’s intentions to
cooperate even when uncertainty was high. Nevertheless, it
is essential to not understand fairness as a substitute which
can easily eliminate people’s uncertainty. Rather, our findings
indicated the lowest willingness to cooperate with the advisor
when UnA and UnD was high. Fairness slightly improved the
willingness but did not set people’s willingness back to baseline
(when there was no uncertainty present). Thus, the way how
advisors treat their customers and explain their products is
critical and should not be neglected in the day-to-day running
of a financial business. Fair treatment during consultancy is one
way to help customers to reduce uncertainty and regain trust in
their financial advisors.
Limitations and Future Directions
An advantage and disadvantage at the same time is that we
collected our data in the field. On the one hand, a limitation of our
research is that we could not control for further variables (loss of
money, risk taking, etc.), on the other hand and at the same time
it may be an advantage because we were able to directly examine
how people cope with the insecure situation after the economic
crisis. Moreover, manipulating a general uncertainty (UMM) and
personal uncertainty (FHT) independently of each other in the
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laboratory could have helped to understand the interplay between
different types of uncertainty and the role of fairness in
this interplay. It would be important for future research to
investigate different types of uncertainty in combination with
the risk of losing real money (e.g., provide investment products
with high vs. low risk) in the controlled environment of the
laboratory. For future research it would also be interesting
to investigate the long-term process of uncertainty and the
reconstruction of trust in the advisor. Uncertainty regarding the
advisor’s intentions might lead to mistrust, and fair treatment
might be a way to regain trust. We are aware that we
only measured people’s intention to cooperate in the future
with the advisor, which is not the same as real behavior.
Nevertheless, we believe that future studies might benefit from
our findings and we hope that researchers further investigate the
positive effect of fairness on cooperation in uncertain financial
conditions.
CONCLUSION
Uncertainties are part of our daily lives and especially part of our
social interactions. In particular in financial consultancies, where
uncertainty regarding an investment decision and uncertainty
regarding the advisor’s intentions are high, we need cues helping
us to deal with those uncertainties. We identified fairness as one
cue helping people to compensate for uncertainty. Furthermore,
our results indicate that customers’ uncertainty about the advisor
is most costly for the customers’ intention to cooperate in
future. However, our further analysis could identify loss of
trust as a mediator, which can explain why customers facing
high uncertainty about the advisor are not willing anymore to
cooperate with their financial advisor.
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